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INTRODUCTION
When consumers buy counterfeit goods online, few realize
what interests are at stake.2 The increasing sale of counterfeit
products on the Internet, however, has not gone unnoticed by law
enforcement or brand owners.3 Acting U.S. Customs and Border
Protection Commissioner David V. Aguilar summarized the
expanding problem:

2
Dana Thomas, The Fight Against Fakes, HARPER‘S BAZAAR, Jan. 2009, at 69–71,
available at http://fakesareneverinfashion.com/luxury_report.asp (health concerns related
to dangerous products and financing terrorism are just two unexpected results).
3
CBP, ICE Release Report on 2011 Counterfeit Seizures, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER
PROT. (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/national
/01092012.xml.
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‗The growth of websites selling counterfeit goods
directly to consumers is one reason why CBP and
ICE have seen a significant increase in the number
of seizures . . . .‘ Although these websites may
have low prices, what they do not tell consumers is
that the true costs to our nation and consumers
include lost jobs, stolen business profits, threats to
our national security, and a serious risk of injury to
consumers.4
The companies that are the targets of counterfeiters range from
luxury goods purveyors to the makers of golf clubs and
pharmaceuticals.
Unsurprisingly, the most commonly
counterfeited goods are clothing, accessories, and shoes.5 The
relocation of these counterfeiting businesses from the street to the
Internet has changed the way trademark right holders pursue the
parties responsible. The best strategy is one applied by countless
law enforcement agencies in the pursuit of illegal enterprises:
follow the money. In the Internet counterfeiting era, the money
leads straight to online service providers (―OSPs‖). OSPs include
providers of search or advertising functions,6 providers of domain
name routing services or registration,7 central auction house or
marketplace websites that allow individualized selling platforms,8
payment processors,9 and countless other service providers that are
essential for the success of a commercial enterprise on the Internet.
Although U.S. Customs and Border Protection (―CBP‖)
intercepts some of these goods en route to the United States, a
significantly larger number make it into this country and are sold
to consumers through websites or brick-and-mortar stores.10 The
4

Id.
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, THE GLOBALIZATION OF CRIME: A
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT 178, Figure 146 (2010),
available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/tocta-2010.html.
6
E.g., GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (last visited Feb. 29, 2012); YAHOO!,
http://www.yahoo.com (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
7
E.g., GODADDY, http://godaddy.com (last visited Feb. 29, 2012); NETWORK
SOLUTIONS, LLC., http://networksolutions.com (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
8
E.g., AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com (last visited Feb. 29, 2012); eBAY,
http://www.ebay.com (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
9
E.g., PAYPAL, http://www.paypal.com (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
10
CBP, ICE Release Report, supra note 3.
5
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Internet is the fastest growing marketplace for these goods. The
issues confronting trademark right holders in the Internet
marketplace for counterfeit goods are unique because the
relationships between purveyors of counterfeit goods and those
providing necessary support services are less transparent and less
personal. The operation of an online store involves different
players than an actual storefront including, for example: online
advertisers, search engines, Internet service providers, Internetonly payment processers, digital marketplaces and auctions,
domain-routing services, and more. The problems trademark right
holders must confront in the Internet marketplace are what
strategies will best protect their intellectual property and how to
deter infringers in a cost efficient way. The answer in the brickand-mortar world was the judicially-created doctrine of
contributory trademark infringement.
In the online world,
however, the application of the contributory liability doctrine to
OSPs presents new challenges for trademark holders and the
courts.
This Note seeks to evaluate the standard for contributory
trademark infringement as applied to OSPs by the courts and to
examine the differing applications of the doctrine in the preInternet context. Part I of this Note reviews the theory underlying
the protection of trademarks and the criminal and civil laws
prohibiting direct trademark infringement, as they form the basis of
a secondary claim for infringement. Next, Part I traces the
development of the contributory trademark infringement doctrine,
and the expansion of the doctrine from manufacturers and
distributors of products to other categories as prescribed by the
common law. The doctrine, in its most recent Supreme Court
iteration, requires that the plaintiff show that a manufacturer or
distributor (1) supplied a product to a third-party infringer and (2)
intentionally induced the third-party‘s infringement or knew or
should have known the infringement was being committed by the
third-party infringer.11
Part II reviews the two competing standards for service
providers promulgated by the Ninth Circuit and both the Fourth
Circuit and the Southern District of New York. The Ninth Circuit
11

See discussion infra Part I.C.2.
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applies a test that requires a provider of services, including OSPs,
to have direct control and monitoring of the third-party infringer
for liability to attach.12 In contrast, the Southern District of New
York, and to some degree the Second Circuit, has applied a test
requiring intentional inducement by the service provider of the
third-party infringer or actual or constructive knowledge of the
infringement by the service provider.13 The Fourth Circuit adopted
this test for service providers.14 Part II also evaluates the
difficulties courts have faced in applying the second prong of the
contributory trademark infringement test promulgated by the
Supreme Court, which requires some knowledge of the
infringement and reviews the four standards of knowledge that the
courts and scholars have applied to service providers in the
contributory infringement context: reasonable anticipation, specific
knowledge, willful blindness, and direct control and monitoring.15
Part III argues that the appropriate test for OSPs is that of the
Southern District of New York and the Fourth Circuit because it is
most similar to the test expounded by the Supreme Court, and
conforms to the underlying common law principles of the doctrine.
This section also argues that the requisite degree of knowledge
must be broader than specific knowledge and narrower than
reasonable anticipation in order to preserve the applicability of the
contributory trademark infringement doctrine to OSPs. This new
standard, consistent with earlier Supreme Court precedent, would
look to whether the supplier of a service ―designedly enabled‖ the
infringement. In other words, the knowledge prong would be met
where the OSP knew that widespread infringement occurred
utilizing its service, and that its service by its very design enabled
that type of infringement.
Finally, Part IV proposes alternative methods to diminish the
impact of Internet-based counterfeiting.
These alternatives
include: a shift in policing, a change in norms regarding
punishment and damage by infringers, and a restriction of
infringement through structural systems.
12
13
14
15

See discussion infra Part II.C.1.
See discussion infra Part II.C.2.
See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
See discussion infra Part II.C.1–4.
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I. THE REALITIES OF ENFORCING TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
Modern trademark jurisprudence assigns two roles to
trademark enforcement: protect consumers and protect trademark
owners.16 Trademark owners file civil suits for trademark
infringement, under both direct and secondary theories of liability,
to protect their brands from the sale of counterfeit goods. A direct
suit can be brought against an individual selling the good directly
to a consumer, like the operator of a flea market booth selling fake
purses. A contributory suit can be brought against a provider of
goods or services who facilitates the direct sale to customers, such
as an advertiser who runs online ads encouraging Internet users to
visit a particular website that sells fake watches. In order to
establish a claim for contributory infringement, there must be an
underlying claim of direct infringement.17 The penalties for direct
infringement arise under both the criminal and civil laws of the
United States. In contrast, contributory trademark infringement is
a judicially-created doctrine, which imposes civil liability on those
providing goods or services to direct infringers. The doctrine of
contributory infringement is closely tied to the underlying acts of
the direct infringer and the nature of the product or service it
provides to the direct infringer. Therefore, a full understanding of
the entire liability scheme for trademark infringement is necessary.
In Part I.A, this Note reviews the purposes underlying current
theories of trademark protection. In Part I.B, this Note evaluates
the significant economic and financial pressures associated with
the sale of counterfeit goods and the legal landscape underlying the
push to find liability for OSPs in the Internet marketplace. In Part
I.C, this Note traces the development of the contributory
infringement doctrine, and the expansion of the doctrine beyond its
traditional boundaries.

16

Two Pesos Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 781–82 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); Inwood Labs., Inc., v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982); Rosetta
Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7082, at *44–45 (4th Cir. Apr. 9,
2012).
17
4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
25:17 (4th ed. 2012).
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A. The Dual Role of Modern Trademarks
A trademark is the symbol of good will a product or service
possesses.18 It can be embodied by ―any word, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof . . . [used] to identify and
distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of
the goods.‖19 The courts have increasingly recognized the
trademark as a device to protect both consumers and brands.20
Consumers rely on the trademark to identify a trusted brand they
have safely used and enjoyed before. Trademark owners invest in
a trademark and continue to provide a quality product or service
because they alone are able to reap the rewards of that mark.
When an interloper sells a counterfeit of a trademarked product,
this usurps both the consumer‘s expectations about the product or
service and the brand‘s legally sanctioned monopoly over the
trademark. The only winner in many instances is the counterfeiter.
To some extent consumers knowingly purchase counterfeits,
generally apparel or accessories, as a status symbol because they
believe their actions are harmless. Nonetheless, the trademark law
does not distinguish between consumers‘ desire for a fake good
versus the real thing in the infringement context.
B. Direct Infringement and the Economics of Counterfeit Goods
Individuals prosecuted under direct trademark infringement
claims are usually the final sellers of counterfeit trademarked
goods—the shop owner, the individual eBay seller, the street
peddler, or the website creator.21 However, the prosecution of
these individuals, civilly or criminally, makes an unremarkable
impact on the tide of counterfeit goods entering the U.S. market.
The financial benefits derived from the sale of counterfeit goods
are generally large in comparison to the cost or likelihood of
getting caught. One study by the Organisation for Economic CoOperation and Development (―OECD‖), estimates that profits from
the international trade in counterfeit products in 2005 were as high
18

Id. at § 2:15.
Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
20
Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 781–82 (Stevens, J., concurring); Ives, 456 U.S. at 855.
21
See generally Intellectual Property Cases, DEP‘T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 14, 2012),
http://www.cybercrime.gov/ipcases.html#trademark.
19
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as $200 billion, greater than the gross domestic product of
approximately one hundred and fifty state economies.22 In a
follow-up study only two years later, the OECD estimated that
counterfeit products in international trade were worth an estimated
$250 billion, or 1.95 percent of total world trade.23 Moreover,
direct infringers are merely a small part of a much larger
counterfeiting system that utilizes the assistance and services of
mainstream service providers, such as landlords, shipping
companies, and online sale platforms, to bring counterfeit goods to
U.S. consumers.24
The counterfeit goods industry brings in millions of dollars
worth of counterfeit goods every year; goods that are never
regulated, taxed, or tested for safety. In 2005, CBP made 8,022
seizures of counterfeit goods with a domestic value of more than
$93 million.25 By 2009, the value of goods seized at U.S. borders
was an estimated $261 million.26 The number of items intercepted
is estimated to be only seven percent of the actual flow of
counterfeit goods into the country,27 which makes the estimated
value of counterfeit goods a staggering $3.73 billion per year.28
The most common counterfeit goods are clothing, accessories, and
shoes; but a disturbing number of dangerous and ineffective
products, including pharmaceuticals, electronics, cosmetics, and
toys, are brought into the marketplace as well.29 Halting the sale of

22

ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., The Economic Impact of Counterfeiting
and
Piracy:
Executive
Summary,
at
15
(2008),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/document/4/0,3746,en_2649_34173_40876868_1_1_1_1,00.html.
23
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., Magnitude of Counterfeiting and Piracy
of Tangible Products—November 2009 Update, at 3 (2009), available at
http://www.oecd.org/document/23/0,3746,en_2649_34173_44088983_1_1_1_1,00.html.
24
See Daniel R. Plane, Going After the Middleman: Landlord Liability in the Battle
Against Counterfeits, 99 TRADEMARK REP. 810, 812–15 (2009).
25
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Intercepts More than $11.4 Million Worth of
Counterfeit Wearing Apparel and Handbags, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT. (Dec. 12,
2005),
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/archives/2005_press_
releases/ 122005/12122005.xml.
26
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 5, at 180.
27
See id. at 181.
28
Id. This number was calculated by the author using the interception estimate and
value estimate from 2009.
29
Id. at 178, Figure 146.
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these goods is a serious concern for law enforcement and brand
owners alike.
The civil penalties for direct trademark infringement arise
under Section 32 of the Lanham Act.30 The elements of a civil
direct infringement claim require that the party make a ―use in
commerce‖ of another‘s mark;31 a ―use [that] is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive;‖32 and that ―the acts
have been committed with knowledge that such imitation is
intended to be used to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive.‖33 The plaintiff must also establish that its mark is
valid.34 The remedies for a successful civil suit may include ―(1)
defendant‘s profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and
(3) the costs of the action;‖35 attorneys‘ fees,36 statutory damages,37
injunctive relief,38 or the destruction of infringing articles.39
30

Lanham Act § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006).
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant—
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered
mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or
advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising
of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable
in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter
provided. Under subsection (b) hereof, the registrant shall not be
entitled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have been
committed with knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.
Id. § 1114(1).
31
Id. § 1114(1)(a).
32
Id. § 1114(1)(b).
33
Id.
34
N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 552 F.3d 1211, 1218 (11th Cir.
2008).
35
15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2006).
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. § 1114.
39
Id. § 1118.
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Despite these other plaintiff-friendly remedies, the main goal of
most right holders is to attain equitable relief in the form of an
injunction against the counterfeit seller.40
Criminal trafficking in counterfeit goods, services, labels,
documentation, or packaging is a criminal offense in the United
States under Title 18 of the U.S. Code.41 For criminal liability to
attach, the government must show that the individual:
[1] intentionally traffic[ked] or attempt[ed] to traffic
in goods or services and knowingly used a
counterfeit mark, or [2] intentionally traffic[ked] or
attempt[ed] to traffic in labels, patches, stickers,
wrappers, badges, emblems, medallions, charms,
boxes, containers, cans, cases, hangtags,
documentation, or packaging of any type or nature,
knowing that a counterfeit mark has been applied
thereto, the use of which is likely to cause
confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive.42
Trafficking in counterfeit goods or services is a felony
punishable by up to ten years for a first offense or up to two
million dollars in fines, or both, with further penalties for repeat
offenders and up to fifteen million dollars in fines for those entities
other than individuals.43 Products that cause bodily harm or death
carry heavier penalties, and require a lesser mens rea showing of
recklessness by the seller of the counterfeit goods or services.44
These criminal penalties have been largely ineffective in
eliminating the wide-scale infringement of consumer goods
because U.S. laws do not impose significant penalties for
infringement45 and the producers of infringing goods are generally

40
Marc E. Ackerman & Daren M. Orzechowski, Trademark Infringement and the
Legal Bases for the Recovery of Economic Damages, in ECONOMIC DAMAGES IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A HANDS ON GUIDE TO LITIGATION 37 (Daniel Slottje ed.,
2006).
41
18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2006).
42
Id. § 2320(a)(1).
43
Id.
44
Id. § 2320(a)(2).
45
See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., Administration’s White Paper on
Intellectual Property Enforcement Legislative Recommendations, at 1 (2011) [hereinafter
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located outside the United States.46 Where the operation includes a
storefront or offers goods in-person, the individual sellers of
counterfeit goods are often illegal immigrants working in informal
trafficking rings with ties to producers or organized crime outside
the United States.47 The arrest of individual sellers has a limited
impact on the importation of counterfeit goods because the
individual sellers are generally replaceable due to their illegal
status.48 In addition, trafficking rings can easily utilize mainstream
shipping methods to move large quantities of infringing product
into the U.S. or other developed countries‘ markets.49
Furthermore, even when offenders are arrested they are
generally not punished to the full extent that the intellectual
property laws allow. The Obama Administration‘s White Paper on
Intellectual Property Enforcement Legislative Recommendations
(―White Paper‖)50 recommended an increase in the sentencing
range for intellectual property crimes (less than half of those
convicted received prison sentences) and for recidivist intellectual
property crime offenders.51
The White Paper noted that
intellectual property crimes were light on punishment despite the
high profit margins associated with trademark infringement,
providing the incentive to sell counterfeit goods, and the
relationship of counterfeiting activity to organized crime.52 It is
not yet clear if the implementation of these recommendations will
impact the counterfeit market.

White
Paper],
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
ip_white_paper.pdf.
46
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 5, at 177.
47
Id. at 180.
48
See id. (―Whatever the role of licit retailers, the bulk of the trade appears to be
conducted through informal markets and street sales. From places like Warsaw‘s once
notorious Stadium Market to dozens of municipal flea markets across the United
Kingdom, thousands of small entrepreneurs flog counterfeit merchandise. Street sales
people are most often illegal immigrants, often from Africa or Asia. There have been
many documented cases of illegal immigrants being forced into counterfeit distribution
by the migrant smugglers.‖).
49
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 5, at 180, 188
(counterfeiters utilize licit shipping and trucking enterprises to move their wares in the
same way that legitimate goods are transported).
50
White Paper, supra note 45.
51
Id. at 4, 8.
52
Id. at 7.
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The meaningful enforcement of criminal counterfeiting laws
and civil trademark infringement suits continues to be a challenge
for both law enforcement and trademark owners. Trademark
owners, unlike law enforcement, are able to use a wider variety of
civil tactics to shut down counterfeiting rings. By pursuing those
who facilitate direct infringement under theories of secondary
liability, brand owners can make the provision of counterfeit goods
to consumers significantly more difficult and costly for
counterfeiters and associated parties.
C. The Doctrine of Contributory Trademark Infringement
The doctrine of contributory trademark infringement is one of
two secondary theories of trademark liability developed by the
courts to impose liability on third parties who facilitate direct
infringement.53 The doctrine allows trademark owners to file suit
against those who assist the activities of direct infringers by
providing goods or services, like OSPs. This Note will focus
exclusively on the doctrine of contributory infringement as a
means to impose liability on third parties and reduce Internet-based
trademark infringement. First, this section will examine the
creation of the contributory infringement doctrine and how it
interacts with the Lanham Act. Then, it will review the current
standard created by the Supreme Court following the Lanham
Act‘s passage. Finally, it will review the expansion of the doctrine
beyond its traditional boundaries.
1. The Origins of Contributory Trademark Infringement
In the landmark case of William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly &
Co.,54 the Supreme Court first recognized the existence of the
doctrine of contributory trademark infringement. In this case the
manufacturer of Coco-Quinine, a medication containing quinine
mixed with cocoa for palatability, sought to enjoin the maker of
Quin-Coco for ―passing off‖ the latter as the former to customers.55
The alleged passing off occurred when salesmen of Quin-Coco

53

MCCARTHY, supra note 16, at § 25:17. The second theory is vicarious liability. Id. §
25:22.
54
265 U.S. 526 (1924).
55
Id. at 532.
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suggested or told druggists to fill prescriptions for Coco-Quinine
with their product.56 The Eli Lilly Court concluded that the
salesmen, and thereby the company, induced the fraud committed
by the druggists and harmed the maker of Coco-Quinine.57 The
Court categorized this inducement as an unfair competition
violation. The contributory trademark infringement doctrine thus
stated that ―[o]ne who induces another to commit a fraud and
furnishes the means of consummating it is equally guilty and liable
for the injury.‖58
The Court further framed the unfair competition—or rather
trademark—violation that occurred by opining that ―[t]he wrong
was in designedly enabling the dealers to palm off the preparation
as that of the respondent.‖59 This ―palming off‖ formulation of the
rule relied upon a series of cases that focused not on inducement,
but on the party‘s knowledge of the role its product played in
facilitating the infringing activity. The test developed in Eli Lilly
gave rise to liability where the party either induced or designedly
enabled a third party to commit fraud. One case the Court relied
upon in formulating this rule was N. K. Fairbank Co. v. R. W. Bell
Manufacturing Co.,60 which recited the English common law
liability rule:
It has been said more than once in this case that the
manufacturer ought not to be held liable for the
fraud of the ultimate seller; that is, the shopkeeper
or the shopkeeper‘s assistant. But that is not the
true view of the case. The question is whether the
defendants have or have not knowingly put into the
hands of the retail dealers the means of deceiving
the ultimate purchasers.61

56

Id. at 530.
Id. at 530–31.
58
Id. (citing Hostetter Co. v. Brueggeman-Reinert Distilling Co. (C. C.), 46 F. 188,
189 (1891)).
59
Id. (citing Coca Cola Co. v. Gay-Ola Co., 200 F. 720 (6th Cir. 1912); N.K. Fairbank
Co. v. R.W. Bell Mfg. Co., 77 F. 869, 875, 877–78 (2d Cir. 1896); Enoch Morgan‘s Sons
Co. v. Whittier-Coburn Co., 118 F. 657, 661 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1902)); Lever v. Goodwin,
[1887] Ch. 1, 3 (Eng.).
60
77 F. 869 (2d Cir. 1896).
61
Id. at 878 (2d Cir. 1896) (quoting Lever v. Goodwin, [1887] Ch. 1 at 3 (Eng.)).
57
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The knowledge element of the English test would later reappear in
the Court‘s modern contributory trademark infringement
jurisprudence.62
The contributory trademark infringement doctrine, despite its
long common law use, has not yet been codified. The first federal
trademark act was created in 1870,63 and subsequent revisions have
preserved the courts‘ ability to apply the contributory infringement
doctrine. The current iteration of U.S. trademark law, the Lanham
Act or the Trademark Act of 1946, continues to preserve the
courts‘ ability to apply common law doctrine to trademark law.64
Nonetheless, an act of direct infringement is still necessary, as
defined by the Lanham Act‘s criminal or civil provisions, for a
contributory infringement action to commence.65 Moreover,
Congress has repeatedly chosen to leave the doctrine to the courts
by failing to legislate on the doctrine when amending the
trademark laws. In contrast, Congress has passed legislation to
nullify a different trademark decision made by the Court where
Congress deemed the decision a violation of the traditional
contours of trademark law.66 Thus, the most recent Supreme Court
case on contributory trademark infringement, decided in 1982,
remains the standard for contributory trademark infringement
today.67
2. Reaffirming the Judicially-Created Doctrine
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the judicially-created doctrine
of contributory trademark infringement in Inwood Laboratories,
Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.68
In Ives, generic drug
manufacturers created drug capsules designed to duplicate the
appearance of a competitor‘s drug capsule for cyclandelate, which
used the brand name Cyclospasmol as its registered trademark

62

See infra Part I.C.2.
S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 2 (1988) (reviewing the legislative history of the Trademark
Law Revision Act of 1988).
64
See S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 5 (1946).
65
MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 25:17.
66
See S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 2 (1988).
67
See infra Part I.C.2.
68
456 U.S. 844 (1982).
63
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after the drug‘s patent expired.69 Some pharmacists then dispensed
the generic drug in bottles mislabeled with the brand name drug
Cyclospasmol.70 The trademark owner and drug manufacturer
alleged that the generic drug manufacturers had induced
pharmacists through their advertising and promotional materials to
improperly substitute generic drugs for its product and mislabel the
bottle as Cyclospasmol.71 Ultimately, due to judicial error on the
part of the lower court, the Supreme Court remanded the case to
the Second Circuit to determine liability under Section 32 of the
Lanham Act. The significance of Ives, however, was not the final
disposition, but rather the Supreme Court‘s articulation of the test
for contributory trademark infringement.
The Court‘s test in Ives differed from earlier iterations of the
contributory trademark infringement doctrine, but preserved the
overall construction of the test. The Ives test permits trademark
holders to pursue civil claims against a manufacturer or distributor
who ―intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, or . . .
continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason
to know is engaging in trademark infringement.‖72 For a
trademark holder to succeed on this secondary, contributory
trademark infringement claim, there must first be a claim of direct
or primary infringement.73 In Ives, the intentional mislabeling and
sale of generics to customers by the pharmacists was the direct
infringement. The cases discussed below extended the boundaries
of the original Ives test, yet relied on the same logic of tying the
contributory infringer‘s liability to inducement or knowledge.
3. The Courts Extend the Test Through Common Law
Principles
Contributory trademark liability claims may now be brought
against landlords,74 service providers,75 franchisors,76 and

69

Id. at 846–48.
Id. at 849–50.
71
Id. at 850.
72
Id. at 854.
73
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
74
Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149
(7th Cir. 1992).
70
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manufacturers or distributors.77 The justifications for extending
liability to these categories have generally depended on common
law principles of tort liability78 or the presence of an agency
relationship.79 In general, the relationship between the infringer
and the party liable for contributory infringement will be a factspecific inquiry aimed at determining whether a threshold level of
knowledge or intent has been met to attach liability. 80 Although
courts have not found the categories to be as straightforward as
they would seem, the doctrine has expanded based on the growing
category of common law relationships in which liability may be
imposed.
The decisions extending Ives‘s contributory infringement
doctrine have relied on the reasoning of two cases: Hard Rock
Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc.81 from the
Seventh Circuit and Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.82 from
the Ninth Circuit. Both cases extended Ives‘s reasoning to apply
against landlords, where their tenants sold counterfeit products. To
do so, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits applied a modified Ives test,
swapping landlords and flea market operators for the Ives test‘s
distributors and manufacturers.83
In Hard Rock Cafe, third-party vendors at two flea markets and
a discount shop sold counterfeit Hard Rock Cafe T-shirts that

75
Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, Inc. (Tiffany II), 600 F.3d 93, 104 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 647 (2010); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980,
984–85 (9th Cir. 1999).
76
Mini Maid Servs. Co. v. Maid Brigade Sys., Inc., 967 F.2d 1516, 1521 (11th Cir.
1992).
77
Inwood Labs., Inc., v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853–54 (1982).
78
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 738 (1938) (―One who induces or aids
persons who purchase goods directly or indirectly from him to market them in such a
manner as to infringe another‘s trade-mark or trade name infringes it himself.‖).
79
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) (―Agency is the fiduciary
relationship that arises when one person (a ‗principal‘) manifests assent to another person
(an ‗agent‘) that the agent shall act on the principal‘s behalf and subject to the principal‘s
control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.‖).
80
See, e.g., Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, Inc. (Tiffany I), 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 507–13
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (applying a fact-specific knowledge analysis).
81
955 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1992).
82
76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
83
Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264–65; Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1149.
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infringed the trademarks held by the plaintiff.84 The court
reasoned that the Ives test could be extended to this relationship,
construed by the court as either a landlord-tenant or licensorlicensee relationship, because the contributory trademark
infringement doctrine was a common law species of tort.85
Determining that the common law permitted tort liability against a
landlord or licensor for the acts of the tenant or licensee, the court
held that Ives equally applied to landlords or licensors as it did to
manufacturers or distributors.86 The court then turned to the
second prong of the Ives test, requiring knowledge of infringement.
Hard Rock Cafe had filed suit without notifying the landlords or
licensors that the shirts being sold were counterfeit,87 but the court
interpreted Ives so as to permit liability where the landlord was
―willfully blind‖ to infringement on the premises.88 The court
equated willful blindness with Ives‘s actual knowledge portion of
the test.89 Finally, the court remanded the case, noting that the
willful blindness test was the correct standard to apply.90
In Fonovisa, the right holder sued a flea market owner for
allowing vendors to sell counterfeit recordings violating its
copyrights and trademarks.91 The evidence at trial revealed that
the trademark holders repeatedly notified the flea market owners of
the infringements, and police raids of the market had resulted in
pirated recordings being seized.92 Nonetheless, the infringements
at the market continued and both parties agreed that the owner had
actual knowledge of the infringements.93 The Ninth Circuit
concluded that the Court in Ives had ―laid down no limiting
principle that would require the defendant to be a manufacturer or
distributor‖94 and relied on Hard Rock Cafe‘s principle of
extending common tort liability because a ―company is responsible
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1145.
Id. at 1149.
Id.
Id. at 1147.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1149.
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 260–61 (9th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 261.
Id.
Id. at 265.
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for the torts of those it permits on its premises knowing or having
reason to know that the other is acting or will act tortiously.‖95
Combining these principles, the court reversed the lower court‘s
ruling and found the flea market liable for contributory trademark
infringement.96
In both cases, the courts determined that Ives had not precluded
the extension of contributory trademark liability to other instances
where tort law has generally found secondary liability.97
Following Hard Rock Cafe and Fonovisa, the contributory
trademark infringement doctrine has been extended to include a
number of other common law relationships where liability may
attach to a third party who knows of or induces infringement.98
For the purposes of this Note, however, the analysis will be
restricted to understanding the developments that affect the
liability of OSPs and other service providers. Part II will address
the divergent tests and standards developing in the courts as an
outgrowth of the doctrine‘s extension into situations beyond that of
a manufacturer or flea-market operator.
II. DOCTRINAL DICHOTOMIES: FINDING THE TEST AND
KNOWLEDGE STANDARD FOR CASES OF INTERNET INFRINGEMENT
Counterfeiting is no longer restricted to the bricks-and-mortar
world; yet, the law has not fully adapted to this new reality. Right
holders, in order to preserve their trademark rights, must continue
to pursue both direct and secondary infringers who sell goods over
the Internet or provide necessary Internet-based assistance to
sellers. For many rights holders pursuing civil actions, this
mission has been met with a series of legal obstacles that prevent
95

Id. (citing Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d
1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted)).
96
Id.
97
Id. (citing Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1149).
98
The doctrine of contributory trademark infringement has also been applied in other
circumstances that are unimportant to this Note‘s analysis of the doctrine. See, e.g.,
Cartier Int‘l B.V. v. Ben-Menachem, 2008 WL 64005, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2008)
(home owners and residents of home where counterfeiting occurs openly and provides a
direct financial benefit); Polo Ralph Lauren Corp. v. Chinatown Gift Shop, 855 F. Supp.
648, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (landlord-tenant liability for building used as premises to sell
counterfeit goods).
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the application of traditional contributory trademark infringement
theories to the Internet.
These obstacles arise out of confusion in the courts over (1)
what test to apply to OSPs and service providers generally and (2)
what degree of knowledge is necessary to comply with Ives‘s
second prong—the ―knows or has reason to know‖ element. This
section will evaluate this confusion and analyze how it has played
out in the courts. First, this section will compare and contrast the
two predominant tests applied by the Ninth Circuit and the
Southern District of New York.99 Second, this section will explore
the problems courts have encountered in attempting to define the
requisite level of knowledge necessary to impose liability.
A. Differences in the Service Provider Tests
The service provider tests for contributory trademark
infringement utilized by the Ninth Circuit and the Southern District
of New York are derived from the test in Ives. Both tests impose
liability for the supply of services where the party intentionally
induces infringement or knows or has reason to know of
infringement by the party receiving the services.100 The Ninth
Circuit, however, adopted an additional ―direct control and
monitoring‖ rule. Courts in the Southern District of New York and
the Fourth Circuit adopted a modified Ives test that simply
switches a service provider for a supplier or manufacturer of a
product.
1. The Ninth Circuit‘s ―Direct Control and Monitoring‖ Rule
The Ninth Circuit in Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network
Solutions, Inc.101 determined that the Ives test could be expanded to
apply to a service provider, rather than one who ―supplies a
product.‖102 Lockheed Martin Corp. (―Lockheed‖), an aircraft
manufacturer, sued the domain name registrar Network Solutions,
Inc. (―NSI‖) for contributory trademark infringement when it

99

The Second Circuit has not technically affirmed the test, but has applied it in the
OSP context.
100
See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982).
101
194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999).
102
Id. at 984.
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allowed third parties to register domain names similar to its ―The
Skunk Works‖ trademark.103 NSI provided a dispute resolution
procedure for post-registration complaints relating to the violation
of a registered trademark.104 Lockheed sent cease-and-desist
letters to NSI to stop the third party use of similar domain names
and to stop third party registration of any variations of its mark.105
NSI denied Lockheed‘s requests because it did not follow the
required dispute resolution procedure, and Lockheed filed its
infringement suit.106
Although the Ninth Circuit extended liability to service
providers, the standard it adopted was different from Ives. The
Ninth Circuit held that the test for contributory infringement by
service providers, rather than a product supplier, requires an
additional showing—beyond the Ives test—of ―[d]irect control and
monitoring of the instrumentality used by a third party to infringe
the plaintiff‘s mark.‖107 The Ninth Circuit rejected Lockheed‘s
contributory infringement claim under its ―direct control and
monitoring‖ rule by comparing NSI to the U.S. Postal Service
when it provides an address to a specific location and routes mail
to the individual living there.108 The court explained, ―NSI
translates the domain-name combination to the registrant‘s IP
Address and routes the information or command to the
corresponding computer.‖109
The Ninth Circuit supported its expansion of the Ives test by
(1) stating that the plain language of Ives applied only to those who
supply a product, and (2) analogizing to Hard Rock Cafe and
Fonovisa to find that the ―direct control and monitoring‖ rule was
necessary for service providers.110 Relying on the Hard Rock Cafe
and Fonovisa courts‘ extension of liability where the common law
landlord-tenant relationship existed, the court determined that ―the
extent of control exercised by the defendant over the third party‘s
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110

Id. at 981–83.
Id. at 982.
Id. at 983.
Id.
Id. at 984.
Id. at 984–85.
Id.
Id.
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means of infringement‖ was an important factor ―when measuring
and weighing a fact pattern in the contributory infringement
context without the convenient ‗product‘ mold.‖111 The Ninth
Circuit further commented that a domain-name routing provider
could not be expected to monitor the Internet.112
2. The Southern District of New York/Second Circuit‘s
Modified Ives Test
The Second Circuit in Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, Inc. (Tiffany II),113
applied a different standard than the Lockheed court. The court‘s
two prong test is essentially identical to the original Ives test:
―[F]irst, if the service provider ‗intentionally induces another to
infringe a trademark,‘ and second, if the service provider
‗continues to supply its [service] to one whom it knows or has
reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement.‘‖114 In
Tiffany II, the jewelry company Tiffany (NJ) Inc. and Tiffany and
Company (together ―Tiffany‖) alleged that eBay, Inc. (―eBay‖)
assisted trademark infringers through its advertising and listing
practices, which allowed counterfeit goods to be sold by third party
sellers on eBay.115 eBay conceded that Ives applied so the Second
Circuit ―assume[d] without deciding that Ives‘s test for
contributory trademark infringement governs.‖116
Thus, the
Second Circuit was not required to and did not expressly adopt the
modified Ives test as the appropriate standard.
The district court‘s opinion is therefore helpful in shedding
light on why the modified Ives test was applied instead of the
typical Lockheed analysis. The district court in Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v.
eBay, Inc. (Tiffany I)117 simultaneously adopted Lockheed‘s
analysis and chose not to apply the test to an online marketplace,
as it categorized eBay. In adopting Lockheed‘s analysis, Judge

111

Id. at 984.
Id. at 985 (citing Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 985 F.
Supp. 949, 958 (C.D. Cal. 1997)).
113
600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010).
114
Id. at 106.
115
Id. at 96.
116
Tiffany II, 600 F.3d at 105–06.
117
576 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 600 F.3d 93 (2d
Cir. 2010).
112
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Sullivan reasoned that it was a ―persuasive synthesis of the
relevant inquiry that the Court must undertake in determining
whether the provider of a service is potentially liable for
contributory trademark infringement,‖ while acknowledging that
the Second Circuit had not yet endorsed any particular standard.118
Then, in an unforeseen twist, the district court found that because
eBay exercised control over and monitored the site, it was
analogous to the flea market cases and governed by the modified
Ives standard applied in Hard Rock Cafe and Fonovisa.119 At the
same time, the court determined that ―eBay clearly falls on the
‗service‘ side of the product/service distinction,‖120 but did not
explain why or how this ―service‖ classification removed eBay
from the purview of Lockheed‘s test for all types of service
providers. Applying this modified Ives test, the Tiffany I court
held for the defendants on the basis of inadequate knowledge of
infringement.121
The Second Circuit did not acknowledge the divergent
standards for OSPs created in the Lockheed and Tiffany I decisions
when it affirmed the lower court‘s application of the modified Ives
standard. Thus, the Second Circuit‘s test for contributory
infringement may or may not be that of the Tiffany I court.
Ultimately, the Second Circuit did not find eBay liable for
contributory infringement because it interpreted the ―knows or has
reason to know‖ prong of Ives to require specific, rather than
general knowledge of infringing sales on its auction site.122 The
Second Circuit also determined that ―willful blindness‖ could
supply the knowledge requirement of the test for service providers,
but that eBay had not been willfully blind in the instant case.123
While Tiffany II did not expand its holding to include an
express adoption of the modified Ives test, some courts in the
Southern District of New York have cited the Second Circuit‘s

118

Id. at 506 (citing e.g. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 416
n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
119
Id. at 506–07.
120
Id. at 506.
121
Id. at 508.
122
Tiffany II, 600 F.3d at 107.
123
Id. at 109–10.
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opinion for this standard124 or recognized it as the applicable test
despite this technicality.125 Other courts have chosen to apply the
Lockheed standard in their contributory trademark infringement
analysis, but incorporate the specific knowledge element required
by the Tiffany II court.126
More recently, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
applied the Tiffany II standard to an OSP in Rosetta Stone Ltd. v.
Google, Inc.127 Rosetta Stone brought suit against Google alleging
a variety of trademark claims arising out of the sale of Google
AdWords to third parties selling counterfeit products.128 The court
vacated the district court‘s grant of summary judgment to Google
on Rosetta Stone‘s contributory trademark infringement claim
because the evidence at the pleading stage was sufficient to
establish a question of fact as to whether Google had more than
generalized knowledge of the infringement.129 Significantly, the
Fourth Circuit made no mention of Lockheed‘s direct control and
monitoring rule.
3. Confusion in the Courts
The divergent legal standards have led to confusion for some
courts as to the appropriate test to apply in new contexts.130 In
particular, the Internet has proven a fruitful area for new
interpretations of the doctrine of contributory trademark
infringement. Predicting the outcome of any one case is difficult
124

E.g., GMA Accessories, Inc. v. BOP, LLC, 765 F. Supp. 2d 457, 464 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (citing Tiffany II, 600 F.3d at 106).
125
E.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Frontline Processing Corp., 721 F. Supp. 2d 228, 248
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (―While the Second Circuit has yet to directly contemplate the validity
of this modified part of the Ives test, I concur with Judge Sullivan that this is a
‗persuasive synthesis.‘‖); Ascentive, LLC v. Opinion Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
143081, at *53, n.24 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2011) (―Where, as here, a party such as
PissedConsumer supplies a service—i.e., hosting a webpage—rather than a product to
one engaging in trademark infringement, the Second Circuit has not decided definitively
that [Ives] applies; instead it assumed without deciding that [Ives] applied because the
[OSP] in that case did not contest Inwood’s application.‖)
126
Nomination Di Antonio E Paolo Gensini S.N.C. v. H.E.R. Accessories, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 130681, at *9–10, *15 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2010).
127
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7082 (4th Cir. Apr. 9, 2012).
128
Id. at *11.
129
Id. at *47–49.
130
See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 117–19.
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due to the novel issues presented by Internet cases and the
difficulties courts face in adapting a doctrine, originally focused on
the physical world, to intangibles. As the Second Circuit noted in
Tiffany II, ―[t]he limited case law leaves the law of contributory
trademark infringement ill-defined.‖131 Although the Second
Circuit has not yet affirmed the Tiffany I standard, the use of the
modified Ives standard by the Southern District of New York and
the Fourth Circuit, has created a circuit split between the Ninth
Circuit and the Fourth Circuit, and potentially the Second Circuit
as well.
B. The Knowledge Prong
The split between the tests of the Ninth Circuit and the
Southern District of New York is inherently tied to the knowledge
requirement of Ives; the differing standards create varying degrees
of knowledge that can lead to liability. The second prong of the
Ives test, which imposes liability when the alleged infringer
―continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has
reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement,‖132 does not
define the degree of knowledge required to satisfy this element.
The current application of the doctrine points to four potential
levels of knowledge that could lead to liability: reasonable
anticipation, specific knowledge, willful blindness, or direct
control and monitoring.
Although the Ives test seems straightforward in requiring that
the contributory infringer ―know[] or ha[ve] reason to know‖ of the
infringement,133 the courts have produced varying results in their
attempts to apply this standard to the actions of service providers
and OSPs.134 Traditionally, the standard could be met when either
the direct infringer‘s conduct signaled to the third party (providing
either a product or service) that an infringement was occurring or
the trademark holder sent notice to the third party that the
infringement was occurring and that the second party‘s actions

131
132
133
134

Tiffany II, 600 F.3d 93, 105 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010).
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982).
Id.
See infra Part II.C.1–4.
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were assisting the infringement.135 Determining whether a specific
service provider has a certain level of knowledge is a fact intensive
inquiry, however, the greater challenge for the courts has been
translating Ives‘s knowledge language into a workable standard for
OSPs and other service providers.
This section will discuss the various interpretations the courts
have developed in applying the ―knows or has reason to know‖
prong of the Ives test. First, this section will examine the
reasonable anticipation standard proposed by the Third
Restatement of Unfair Competition Law. Then, it will discuss the
distinction between specific and general knowledge made by the
Second Circuit in Tiffany II. Next, this section will address the
willful blindness standard applied by the Seventh Circuit in
Fonovisa and Hard Rock Cafe, and acknowledged by the Second
Circuit in Tiffany II. Finally, this section will review Lockheed‘s
direct control and monitoring standard to determine what level of
knowledge it requires.
1. Reasonable Anticipation
The least stringent interpretation of the ―knows or has reason to
know‖ prong is the reasonable anticipation standard proposed by
the Third Restatement of Unfair Competition.
One who markets goods or services to a third
person who further markets the goods or services in
a manner that subjects the third person to liability to
another for infringement . . . is subject to liability to
that other for contributory infringement if:
(a) the actor intentionally induces the third person to
engage in the infringing conduct; or
(b) the actor fails to take reasonable precautions
against the occurrence of the third person‘s
infringing conduct in circumstances in which the
infringing conduct can be reasonably anticipated.136

135

See generally, e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir.
1996); Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143 (7th
Cir. 1992).
136
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27 (1995).
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The Restatement further modifies this rule by stating that the
―duty to take reasonable precautions, however, arises only when
the manufacturer or distributor has reason to anticipate that some
substantial number of infringing sales will otherwise occur.‖137 If
an actor has a reasonable belief that infringing sales will occur, the
actor need only take reasonable precautions to prevent the
infringement.138
Nonetheless, this standard has yet to be applied by any U.S.
court to an OSP. The Second Circuit explicitly rejected this
standard in Tiffany II.139 Moreover, the Supreme Court in Ives
dismissed the ―reasonably anticipate‖ standard of knowledge as
being ―‗watered down‘ and incorrect,‖ but did not explicitly rule
on this standard of knowledge.140 ―The Court‘s decision, however,
has not been interpreted to preclude reliance on the ‗reasonably
anticipate‘ standard in actions at common law.‖141
In response to Tiffany II, some scholars have emphasized that
the correct standard should be reasonable anticipation when
looking at online marketplaces.142 In their analysis, these scholars
rely on cases prior to the Tiffany II decision that suggest that
generalized knowledge of infringement is a component of a full
liability analysis, which examines the totality of the
circumstances.143 They conclude that
[t]he common law roots of contributory liability
suggest that the ―intermediate scope‖ afforded by a
negligence standard (―reason to know‖) is the
historical norm and the standard articulated by Ives.
Generalized knowledge of widespread tortious
137

Id. cmt. c.
Id.
139
Tiffany II, 600 F.3d 93, 110 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010).
140
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 n.13 (1982).
141
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27 cmt. b (1995) (citing CibaGeigy Corp. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 547 F. Supp. 1095 (D.N.J. 1982), aff’d, 719 F.2d 56
(3d Cir. 1983)).
142
See David H. Bernstein & Michael R. Potenza, Why the Reasonable Anticipation
Standard Is the Reasonable Way to Assess Contributory Trademark Liability in the
Online Marketplace, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 9, ¶ 5 (2011). Notably, the authors of
this proposition previously wrote an amicus curiae brief, arguing Tiffany & Co.‘s
position, submitted to the Second Circuit in the case. Id. n.1.
143
Id. ¶ 3.
138
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conduct by third parties has long been recognized as
a basis for common law contributory liability.144
Ultimately, they argue that the liability rule should allow for
constructive knowledge of infringement and liability based on the
reasonable anticipation standard.145 They do not specifically argue
that the standard is applicable outside of the online marketplace,
but do assert that it could be applied to the ―bricks-and-mortar‖
world.146
2. Specific Knowledge
In Tiffany II, the Second Circuit held that eBay was not liable
for the sales of counterfeit goods conducted by its sellers. Liability
did not attach because eBay had only general knowledge of
infringement and had a removal process in place to take down
infringing sellers once they were notified by the right holder of
infringement.147 The Second Circuit determined that the ―knew or
should have known‖ standard of Ives required more than
―generalized notice‖ of infringement; the contributory infringer
would need ―[s]ome contemporary knowledge of which particular
listings are infringing or will infringe in the future.‖148 The
requirement of specific knowledge is especially important in the
Internet context because OSPs often provide services to a
significantly greater number of largely unknown parties than
would a landlord or distributor.
Courts that have applied and construed the specific knowledge
rule have provided little additional commentary on the principle.
Two cases have held that specific knowledge was not present when
the notice of possible infringement consisted of an existing
trademark registration for the infringed mark.149
In GMA
144

Id. ¶ 42.
Id. ¶ 68.
146
Id. ¶ 77.
147
Tiffany II, 600 F.3d 93, 107–08 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010).
148
Id. at 107.
149
GMA Accessories, Inc. v. BOP, LLC, 765 F. Supp. 2d 457, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(―The only post-Tiffany case in this district to face the issue has held that ‗Plaintiffs‘
allegations of knowledge are therefore insufficient to the extent they rely on . . .
[Plaintiff‘s] federal registration.‘ This Court agrees.‖) (quoting Nomination Di Antonio
E Paolo Gensini S.N.C. v. H.E.R. Accessories Ltd., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130681, at
*15 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2010)).
145
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Accessories, Inc. v. BOP, LLC,150 the court ruled that constructive
notice from a federal trademark registration is insufficient notice of
infringement.151 Then, the court interpreted Tiffany II‘s specific
knowledge requirement as being ―indicative of a narrow test
requiring a significant degree of knowledge.‖ In Nomination Di
Antonio E Paolo Gensini S.N.C. v. H.E.R. Accessories Ltd.,152 the
Southern District of New York dismissed the plaintiff‘s case at the
pleading stage where the only evidence of specific knowledge was
the plaintiff‘s trademark registration and a letter sent to the
defendants before the commencement of the suit notifying them of
infringement where there was no proof the defendants continued to
provide services thereafter.153 Other cases applying the specific
knowledge standard have provided little additional commentary on
the difference between general and specific knowledge.154 Thus,
the courts have left the meaning of specific knowledge vague and
uncertain outside of the Tiffany II context.
3. Willful Blindness
Willful blindness was held by the Seventh Circuit in Hard
Rock Cafe to meet the requisite degree of knowledge required by
Ives. The Second Circuit in Tiffany II reaffirmed the validity of the
willful blindness standard of knowledge against OSPs. The court
explained the willful blindness standard in the context of the online
marketplace:
[I]f eBay had reason to suspect that counterfeit
Tiffany goods were being sold through its website,
and intentionally shielded itself from discovering
the offending listings or the identity of the sellers
behind them, eBay might very well have been
charged with knowledge of those sales sufficient to
satisfy [Ives‘] ―knows or has reason to know‖

150

765 F. Supp. 2d 457.
Id. at 465.
152
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130681.
153
Id. at *16–17.
154
See e.g., Coach, Inc. v. Gata Corp., 2011 WL 2358671, at *7–8 (D.N.H. June 9,
2011).
151
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prong. A service provider is not . . . permitted
willful blindness.155
The willful blindness standard has traditionally satisfied the
knowledge requirement under Ives,156 and apparently satisfies the
Second Circuit‘s specific knowledge standard. The Second Circuit
was careful to reiterate that willful blindness is different than the
reasonable anticipation standard.157
4. Direct Control and Monitoring
Lockheed created a new standard for service providers; this test
transformed the ―knows or has reason to know‖ requirement into a
far more stringent one by attaching the direct control and
monitoring requirement. The Ninth Circuit determined that the
provision of routing services to domain name registrants who had
infringed the plaintiff‘s trademark could not be governed by the
traditional test of Ives.158 The court applied this standard because
it determined that all service providers, and by default OSPs,
required a different level of scrutiny.159 This new standard of
knowledge required that the party, in addition to meeting the Ives
knowledge requirement, must have ―[d]irect control and
monitoring of the instrumentality used by a third party to infringe
the plaintiff‘s mark.‖160 This test turns the second prong of Ives on
its head because it eliminates liability for knowledge alone under
the ―knows or has reason to know‖ prong.
Chief Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit, however, has
construed Lockheed‘s standard to be less stringent than the Ninth
Circuit majority in a case applying Lockheed to another OSP. In
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa International Service Association,161 the
plaintiff owned a number of copyrighted images marked with its
―PERFECT 10‖ trademark that were sold illegally by other
155
Tiffany II, 600 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010)
(citation omitted).
156
Id. at 110.
157
Id. at 110 n.15.
158
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984–85 (9th Cir.
1999).
159
Id.
160
Id. at 984.
161
494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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websites.162 The defendants were payment processors for these
sites.163 The court found that the payment processers lacked the
requisite knowledge and control because the defendants did not
have the right to directly stop the activity and the plaintiff failed to
present facts showing that third parties infringed the trademark.164
The court further explained that the control requirement was not
met where, as here, the party could simply choose to stop
processing payments.165 A dissenting Judge Kozinski argued that
the provision of payment processing services to a website selling
infringing trademarked images met the direct control and
monitoring standard.166 Judge Kozinski reasoned that
credit cards are directly involved in every infringing
transaction; not only do they process the payment
for virtually every sale of pirated images by the
Stolen Content Websites, they control whether such
transactions will go forward. This is more than
enough to establish the ―control and monitoring‖
that Lockheed Martin requires for contributory
trademark infringement.167
Judge Kozinski‘s reasoning has been cited with approval by at
least one other court where payment processors furnished the
means to receive payment for infringements.168
III. THE FUTURE OF CONTRIBUTORY TRADEMARK LIABILITY ON THE
INTERNET—ONE TEST AND ONE STANDARD OF KNOWLEDGE
Part III of this Note proposes two solutions regarding the
diverging standards the courts face in applying contributory
trademark infringement analysis to OSPs. First, this part argues
that the appropriate OSP standard for contributory trademark
infringement is that of the Tiffany II court, and that the additional
162

Id. at 793.
Id.
164
Id. at 807.
165
Id.
166
Id. at 822.
167
Id.
168
E.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Frontline Processing Corp., 721 F. Supp. 2d 228, 253
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
163
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element applied by the Ninth Circuit in Lockheed is an incorrect
interpretation of the doctrine. In addition, this part argues that the
appropriate degree of knowledge, in the OSP context, cannot
require either specific knowledge or direct control and monitoring
for the doctrine to have meaning in the online world. Instead, the
knowledge prong of the contributory infringement doctrine must
be interpreted in light of the common law precedents upon which it
was formulated.
A. The Proper Test for OSPs is the Modified Ives Test
The Ninth Circuit in Lockheed and the Fourth Circuit in
Rosetta Stone applying Tiffany II‘s test have created a circuit split
over the proper test to apply to OSPs.169 Although the Second
Circuit has not expressly adopted the Ives standard, presumably it
will follow its analysis in Tiffany II.170 District courts below the
Second Circuit have continued to apply Lockheed in some
instances.171 The test, however, that is most likely to survive
judicial scrutiny and adhere to Supreme Court precedent is that of
Tiffany II, due to its similarity to Ives and to the Supreme Court‘s
jurisprudence preserving the contributory infringement doctrine‘s
grounding in tort law.172 The Ninth Circuit made a number of
distinctions in creating its direct control and monitoring rule that
are inapplicable when the doctrine is used properly. These
distinctions focus primarily on whether: (1) goods and services
should inherently be treated differently and (2) the common law
underpinning the doctrine ultimately controls the expansion of the
doctrine or some other principle should determine its expansion.

169

Compare Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th
Cir. 1999), with Tiffany II, 600 F.3d 93, 110 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647
(2010).
170
See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
171
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
172
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 863 (1982); see generally Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 428 (1984) (referring to
contributory copyright infringement as a tort), Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev.
Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931) (―Infringement, whether direct or contributory, is
essentially a tort, and implies invasion of some right of the patentee.‖); L‘Aiglon
Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 651 (3d Cir. 1954) (discussing the
creation of a species of federal tort via the Lanham Act).
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The Ninth Circuit‘s determination in Lockheed that a service
provider must inherently be treated differently than a landlord or
manufacturer is an artificial premise.173 Analogizing to the flea
market line of cases, the court determined that some sort of
relationship—one of direct control and monitoring—had to exist
between the infringer and the service provider in order for liability
to attach.174 The Ninth Circuit, however, fails to fully reason out
why this distinction is necessary based on the extension of liability
in Hard Rock Cafe and Fonovisa to landlords and licensors.
Moreover, as demonstrated by Judge Kozinski‘s dissent in Perfect
10, the rule can be bent to support liability against any number of
OSPs that do not actually ―directly control and monitor‖ the
activities of third-parties. The greatest error in the Ninth Circuit‘s
test is that, if strictly applied, it would preclude almost any finding
of contributory infringement online. The rule would permit blatant
and obvious infringement to occur even where the OSP provides a
necessary instrument for the infringement to continue and knows
that it supports the infringement. Accepting the Ninth Circuit‘s
standard is tantamount to giving OSPs Internet immunity.
In contrast, the Second Circuit‘s standard iterated in Tiffany II
simply exchanges the product element of the Ives test for services
without attaching a new tort-based liability element that exceeds
the traditional boundaries of the test.175 Ives imposes liability for
two types of tortious conduct: intentional and negligent.176
Intentional inducement clearly fits the first category of tortious
conduct, as does continuing to provide a good or service the party
knows causes harm. Providing a product where the party should
have knowledge that it will result in harm to a third party meets the
negligence standard. The attachment of the direct control and
monitoring element goes beyond the common law tort framework
that the contributory trademark infringement doctrine was
designed to implement. The direct control and monitoring rule
creates a special category of liability where no special duty existed
before. Although Lockheed derives this alleged duty from the
173

For a summary of the Ninth Circuit‘s holding see supra text accompanying notes
104–06.
174
See supra Part II.A.1.
175
See supra Part II.A.2.
176
See supra Part I.C.2.
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landlord-tenant context, there is no duty imposed by the common
law outside that context, which creates this relationship between
service providers and service recipients. Moreover, trademark law
already provides an alternative means of accounting for
relationships of control—vicarious trademark infringement.
Vicarious liability can be imposed where there is an ―apparent or
actual partnership with the infringer or . . . joint ownership or
control over the infringing product.‖177 Blending the two tests
together is unnecessary and imposes an undue burden on
trademark right holders.
The similarity between the Ives test and the Tiffany II test is
readily apparent. The Second Circuit merely replaces the goods
requirement with a goods or services requirement, preserving the
use and knowledge standards of the Ives test.178 Although the
Supreme Court may alter this standard within Ives‘s structure,
there is no indication that an additional element is necessary to
apply the test in the OSP context. As the Supreme Court noted
most recently in Citizens United v. FEC, ―[o]ur precedent is to be
respected unless the most convincing of reasons demonstrates that
adherence to it puts us on a course that is sure error.‖179 Common
law tort principles support liability for those who permit another to
act tortiously through the use of another‘s premises or
instrumentality.180 Moreover, the Court‘s only other commentary
on the doctrine was in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc.,181 soon after the decision in Ives, where it reaffirmed
the Ives test as the ―narrow standard‖ for contributory trademark
infringement.182 A further narrowing of the standard is unlikely
because it would violate the Court‘s jurisprudence and remove the
standard from its grounding in tort law. Thus, the proper test for
OSPs is the Second‘s Circuit‘s modified Ives test.
177

MCCARTHY, supra note 16, at § 25:22.
Compare Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982), with
Tiffany II, 600 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010).
179
130 S. Ct. 876, 911–12 (2010).
180
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 877(c) (1979) (―For harm resulting to a third
person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he . . . permits the
other to act upon his premises or with his instrumentalities, knowing or having reason to
know that the other is acting or will act tortiously.‖).
181
466 U.S. 417, 439 n.19 (1984).
182
Id.
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B. The Standard for “Knowledge”
The knowledge requirement of Ives is based on the common
law of torts. This requirement contemplates actual knowledge.
The ―reason to know‖ requirement is generally meant to ―denote
the fact that the actor has information from which a person of
reasonable intelligence or of the superior intelligence of the actor
would infer that the fact in question exists, or that such person
would govern his conduct upon the assumption that such fact
exists.‖183 Therefore, a standard that requires a significantly
altered construction of the Ives test cannot meet this level of
knowledge.
This Note argues that the courts must reject the specific
knowledge test, the reasonable anticipation test, and the direct
control and monitoring rule because none of these tests accurately
reflect the meaning of the knowledge prong. Instead, this Note
proposes that existing case law and common law tort principles
continue to support the willful blindness doctrine as well as an
additional interpretation of the knowledge prong based on the early
common law understanding of the doctrine. The alternative
interpretation that this Note proposes looks to the Supreme Court‘s
first iteration of the test in Eli Lilly for instruction. In Eli Lilly, the
Court formulated the second prong of the doctrine as the act of
―designedly enabling‖ a fraud.184 This prong was created to
encapsulate the English rule: ―whether the defendants have or have
not knowingly put into the hands of the [direct infringer] the means
of deceiving the ultimate purchasers.‖185
First, both the reasonable anticipation and specific knowledge
requirements, supported respectively by the Third Restatement of
Unfair Competition and the Second Circuit, should be rejected.
The principle reason is that both of these standards ignore the ongoing relationship between the two parties that allows the
infringement to occur and continue to occur through the provision
of services. The direct infringer and the party facilitating that
infringement are not mere strangers in a faceless Internet world.
183

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12(1) (1965).
William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 530 (1924).
185
N. K. Fairbank Co. v. R. W. Bell Mfg. Co., 77 F. 869, 878 (2d. Cir. 1896) (quoting
Lever v. Goodwin, 36 Ch. 1 (1887)).
184
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Both the reasonable anticipation standard and the specific
knowledge standard rely too little or too much, respectively, on the
actions of the trademark right holder to determine liability; rather,
the focus should be on the actions of and relationship between the
infringer and alleged contributory infringer. In Ives, there was no
discussion of notice to the generic drug manufacturer about the
pharmacists‘ actions. In Hard Rock Cafe, the court noted that no
notice was given to the landlords, but proceeded to elaborate on the
contours of the willful blindness standard.186 The focus of the
courts was unequivocally tied to the nature of the relationship
between the manufacturer or landlord and the direct infringer.
Moreover, the reasonable anticipation and specific knowledge
standards are unduly burdensome for either the alleged infringer or
the aggrieved trademark right holder. The reasonable anticipation
standard would require hyper-vigilance on the part of OSPs; the
specific knowledge standard would impose too high a financial
cost on trademark right holders seeking to preserve their trademark
rights. The realities of enforcing the common law protection of the
contributory trademark infringement doctrine to OSPs should not
be ignored in reformulating the doctrine to fit the modern world.
The test proposed here allows for a more generalized
knowledge than the specific knowledge bar applied by the Second
Circuit in Tiffany II, but it is not the generalized knowledge
standard rejected by that court. This Note proposes that the
meaning of the knowledge prong should be interpreted to find
liability where: (a) knowledge of a particular type of fraud or abuse
is widespread and (b) the OSP knows or has reason to know that its
service is a necessary tool that designedly enables third-party
infringement. To designedly enable infringement, the service must
be an essential part of the process in completing the infringement.
For example, in the case of a credit card processor and infringing
site, no online sale would occur without the payment processing.
In the example of an online marketplace like eBay, this knowledge
standard would impose liability where the design of eBay‘s seller
platform is an essential part of the process to complete the
infringement. The evidence in Tiffany II suggests that eBay‘s
186
See Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143,
1149 (7th Cir. 1992).
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system is able to quickly disable infringing listings when reported
by the trademark holder.187 However, its failure to devise a system
that prevents or limits the ability of infringers to post infringing
articles in the first place suggests that liability may be imposed
under this new standard were it applied to a case like Tiffany II.
This Note acknowledges the difficulties OSPs may experience in
designing new systems to accommodate the rights of trademark
holders, but ultimately concludes that OSPs will be able to design
systems that do not by their very design serve to enable
infringement without a significant burden to the OSPs.
In addition, this new standard still allows liability to attach
under the willful blindness and specific knowledge standards.
Tiffany II correctly expounded on the requirements of willful
blindness. Specific knowledge could still be required where there
is a lack of information about whether a given type of direct
infringer is utilizing a service in a particular way or has somehow
managed to circumvent new measures designed to prevent
infringing sales. Where there is genuine ambiguity about whether
a specified service is facilitating infringement by its very design,
specific knowledge of infringement is the appropriate standard.
This standard is correct in this instance because holding a party
liable for contributory infringement where that party cannot
identify an infringement would violate the knowledge requirement.
However, in many instances infringement by the primary
infringer will be much more obvious. For example, when web
sites explicitly state that replicas or fakes with the trademark on the
items are sold, there is a sufficiently obvious violation and OSPs
must design systems or methods to root out these violators and
deny their services to these infringing parties. These are cases
where the OSP knows or should know that the product being sold
is infringing without additional information from the trademark
right holder. The Second Circuit clearly believed that the willful
187

See Tiffany II, 600 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (―For nearly a decade, including the
period at issue, eBay has also maintained and administered the Verified Rights Owner
(‗VeRO‘) Program—a notice-and-takedown system allowing owners of intellectual
property rights including Tiffany, to report to eBay any listing offering potentially
infringing items, so that eBay could remove such reported listings.‖).
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blindness standard would cover these types of obvious activity.188
However, many OSPs will not have the same investigatory
procedures or capabilities in place as eBay did and signs of blatant
infringement may go unnoticed. Although the Second Circuit
accepts the alternative standard of willful blindness, its ultimate
ruling on knowledge points to the need for the ―designedly
enabled‖ standard of knowledge as well. Tiffany II implies that
once some knowledge of infringing activities is made, the OSP is
on notice of potential future infringement and must act
accordingly.189 The ―designedly enabled‖ requirement simply
imposes on OSPs the obligation to make sure they are not actively
facilitating infringement by providing services in such a way as to
make infringement as equally likely as legal activity.
IV. SOLUTIONS OUTSIDE OF THE COURTROOM
Although suits for contributory trademark infringement are one
strategy trademark holders may pursue, they are unlikely to deter
or stop the sale of counterfeit products absent a change in the
contributory trademark infringement doctrine. Alternative avenues
for trademark protection may in fact yield greater results in
tackling the problem. One such strategy is to collaborate with
credit card processors and payment processors to cut off the
primary payment methods utilized by counterfeiters. Another
solution is to change the norms surrounding intellectual property
violations by increasing both the ability of customs and other law
enforcement personnel to identify counterfeits and arrest violators
and the criminal punishment for offenders.
A. An Uneasy Marriage: Credit Card Processors and Trademark
Holders
A coalition between payment processors and trademark holders
may provide the easiest means to shut down counterfeit sites and
sellers on auction sites. Payment processors are increasingly aware
of their potential liability under the theory of contributory
trademark infringement. The dissent by Judge Kozinski in Perfect
188
189

See id. at 109.
Id. at 109–10.
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10190 suggests that payment processors may have plenty to worry
about in the future from trademark holders seeking to shut down
infringing Internet sellers. Kozinski applied Lockheed‘s service
test and determined that ―credit cards are directly involved in every
infringing transaction; not only do they process the payment for
virtually every sale . . . they control whether such transactions will
go forward. This is more than enough to establish ‗control and
monitoring.‘‖191 Presumably circuits that require a lesser degree of
knowledge would have an easier time finding liability.
Furthermore, the Southern District of New York in Gucci
America, Inc. v. Frontline Processing Corp.192 determined that a
credit card processor could be liable under the Second Circuit‘s
theory of contributory trademark infringement.193 The district
court noted that the sale of infringing goods wholly depended on
the provision of credit card services by the defendants, relying on
Judge Kozinski‘s reasoning in Perfect 10 that ―[i]n a commercial
environment, distribution and payment are . . . like love and
marriage—you can‘t have one without the other. If cards don‘t
process payments, pirates don‘t deliver booty.‖194 Even if the
direct control and monitoring rule were to continue to be applied
by the courts, the reasoning of courts could begin to follow that of
Judge Kozinski‘s realistic approach to online infringement.
Credit card and payment processors are likely to heed the
warning. One instructive example is that of payment processors
and child pornography sites.
Child pornography, like
counterfeiting, is a multi-billion dollar industry that has grown
with the success of the Internet due to the ease of access to illicit
material and the ability to pay by credit card or payment
processor.195 Although child pornography is clearly a different and
more obvious form of exploitation, the same principle of ―shutting

190

494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
Id. at 822 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
192
721 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y 2010).
193
Id. at 249–50.
194
Id. at 253 (quoting Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 818 (Kozinski, J., dissenting)).
195
The Financial Coalition Against Child Pornography—Fact Sheet, NAT‘L CTR. FOR
MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.missingkids.com/missing
kids/servlet/PageServlet?LanguageCountry=en_US&PageId=3703 [hereinafter Fact
Sheet].
191
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down the money‖ applies where money is the major reason the
illicit market thrives online and criminal enforcement of the laws is
difficult if not impossible.
One group that has sought to ―shut down the money‖ is the
Financial Coalition Against Child Pornography (―the Coalition‖),
which promotes best practices for preventing and detecting child
pornography in order to remove child pornography merchants from
payment and credit card processor services.196 The Coalition has
as its members most major credit card processors, Internet pay
processors like PayPal, and the domain registrar GoDaddy.com,
Inc.197
The recommended approach involves gathering
information about the proposed business, screening merchants, and
requiring identifying background information on owners before
pay services are provided to ensure they are legitimate sellers.198
Some follow-up monitoring of the sites is recommended; however,
the principle mechanism is a preventative one.199
This approach does not require payment processors to maintain
constant vigilance. Instead, this approach requires due diligence
from processors seeking to enter a business relationship with a web
site that wants the ability to receive payment from customers. The
same level of due diligence for proposed counterfeit sites is likely
to reduce the ability of illicit sellers to reach customers. Requiring
that payment processers and OSPs perform some due diligence on
those utilizing their services is clearly a fair bargain to make when
many sites and sellers openly brand themselves as offering fakes,
replicas, and copies.
B. Changing Norms and a Role for Law Enforcement in
Intellectual Property Crimes
The criminalization of intellectual property crimes was a
decision made by Congress; however, difficulties in enforcing
these penalties have reduced the deterrent value of these criminal
196

FIN. COAL. AGAINST CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, Internet Merchant Acquisition and
Monitoring Best Practices for the Prevention and Detection of Commercial Child
Pornography, FDIC (May 2007), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2007/
fil07072a.pdf.
197
Fact Sheet, supra note 195.
198
Id. at 2–7.
199
Id. at 8–10.

966

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 22:927

penalties to almost nothing.200 President Obama‘s White Paper
provides guidelines for increasing the deterrent effectiveness of
criminal penalties for counterfeiting offenses.201
These
recommendations include increasing statutory maxima and
sentencing ranges, increasing law enforcement and rights holders‘
access to pre-seizure and post-seizure information, increasing
pharmaceutical regulations, permitting voluntary disclosures of
infringing products to relieve an unwitting party of liability, and
strengthening CBP‘s authority to issue penalties.202 Although
these are small steps, they will increase the ability of law
enforcement and rights holders to successfully identify
infringements and carry out the law. A collaborative approach that
allows rights holders to identify infringing products quickly will
boost CBP‘s ability to act swiftly against infringing importers.
Increased penalties will also make the lucrative counterfeit
business less attractive to some offenders and keep more offenders
off the streets or the web for a longer time period.
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of contributory trademark infringement is an
increasingly important tool for trademark holders fighting the sale
of counterfeit goods online. Pursuing direct infringers is both
costly and meaningless where the global scale of trademark
infringement barely allows trademark owners to put a dent in
infringing sales. Alternatives to civil suits in the form of coalitions
between brand owners and payment processors or increased CBP
enforcement capacity may be essential to stemming the flow of
illicit goods. Ultimately, this Note proposes that certainty
regarding the doctrine of contributory trademark infringement will
allow trademark holders to make smart choices in defending their
brands online, and allow OSPs to protect against allegations by
creating and designing new systems to prevent infringement that
comply with the law. The doctrine must also prove to be workable
in the context of the Internet because the number of goods sold
online and imported into the United States continues to grow and,
200
201
202

See supra text accompanying notes 6–43.
WHITE PAPER, supra note 44, at 1.
Id. at 1–3.
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for practical and jurisdictional reasons, the only recourse
trademark holders will have is the contributory infringement
doctrine. The flow of counterfeit products is likely to increase as
the profits to be gained are great and the current penalties, both
penal and financial, are limited. Stopping the flow of products is
only possible if OSPs bear some of the responsibility for limiting
direct infringers capacity to infringe.
Part III of this Note argues that the courts should universally
adopt the modified Ives standard, and reject the ―direct control and
monitoring rule‖ of the Ninth Circuit. Ignoring the common law
underlying the Ives decision would remove the justification for
imposing any liability for contributory trademark infringement.
The courts must adopt a rule that complies with common law
precedent and protects the traditional rights held by trademark
owners. Treating OSPs under a special category of liability
because of the new and unique nature of the Internet does a
disservice to both right holders and consumers who rely upon
trademark owners to protect their mark and keep infringing
materials out of the marketplace. OSPs must share their portion of
the responsibility where they intentionally or negligently allow
infringement to continue through the use of their services.
Therefore, interpreting the knowledge prong to include knowledge
of widespread infringement with a service that designedly enables
the primary infringer is both more consistent with historical
precedent and better able to respond to the realities of infringement
in the modern age.
Although there may be alternatives to a robust contributory
infringement test, as discussed in Part IV, these alternatives should
be viewed as additional methods for stopping the ever-increasing
flow of online infringement.
The courts must adapt the
contributory trademark infringement doctrine to the realities of
Internet based infringement—not by altering the test, but by
understanding the underlying nature of OSPs as infringement
enablers. OSPs must design their services or perform due
diligence to ensure that they provide services based on a system
that does not ignore or actively enable tortious conduct. The costs
of Internet immunity for OSPs to consumers and right holders alike
should be measured against the benefit of freeing OSPs from
liability for all contributory trademark infringement suits. The
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law must adapt to the realities of online infringement. If not, the
dual purposes of the trademark law—to protect customers and
brands alike—will be forever lost in favor of counterfeiters,
pirates, and all those who designedly enable infringement.

